Setup in 2009 by the now former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, The Chilcot Inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War finally presented its verdict on last Wednesday. Headed by Sir John Chilcot, the inquiry is among the longest running inquires in British history looking into Britain’s role in Iraq during the run up to the war, the military action and its aftermath between 2001 to 2009.
The inquiry focused on all aspects of war including the decision by former PM Tony Blair, analysis of the Intelligence services, especially MI6, actions of the military and its generals and the advise of Lord Peter Goldsmith, the then attorney general. It was supposed to take a year to conduct, instead the inquiry has taken seven years costing the taxpayer £10m, the report contains 12 volumes and running unto 2.6m words.
The key points:
- Sir John Chilcot said the invasion was “not a last resort” concluding the UK chose to join the invasion before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted.
- The intelligence community’s judgement about the severity of the threat posed by the supposed weapons of mass destruction was not justified.
- The post-invasion planing for Iraq was “wholly inadequate.” He said the consequences of the invasion was underestimated
- The War itself was a failure as the government failed to achieve its objectives.
The authority of the United Nations security council was undermined by the UK. Sir John said that Mr Blair and Mr Straw blamed France for the “impasse” in the UN and claimed that the UK government was acting on behalf of the international community “to uphold the authority of the security council”. In the absence of a majority in support of military action the UK was, in fact, undermining the security council’s authority.
The process of deciding the legal basis of UK military action was far from satisfactory but they did not tell if the military intervention itself was legal or not.
The joint intelligence committee should have told Tony Blair clearly to accept the limitations of the intelligence reports about Iraq’s WMD capability.
Blair overlooked the threat to the UK due to the invasion despite being warned that the invasion would increase from Al-Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. Tony Blair, also had been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.
Another criticism against Blair is that he should have anticipated the post-invasion problems. During his testimony to the inquiry Mr Blair said the problems after the invasion could not be anticipated in advance. The inquiry said the risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and al-Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.
The final point is that Blair overestimated his ability to influence American decision makers about Iraq.
While the full ramifications of the verdict is still to sink in some of the initial reactions to the day came from Tony Blair himself, Jeremy Corbyn and senior people of 2003 cabinet.
Among the declassified memos is one from July 2002, roughly 8 months before the war where Tony Blair tells George W Bush, “I will be with you, whatever.”
Jeremy Corbyn, paid tribute to the fallen and said the report should not have taken this long. He said the “overwhelming weight of international legal opinion” says the invasion was illegal. It had devastating consequences, fuelling terrorism and war across the region. It has led a break-down in trust in politics. He says we must be saddened by what has been revealed. Many MPs voted to stop the war. But they have not lived to see themselves vindicated.
Tony Blair said he takes full responsibility for the Iraq war, without exception or excuse. He added he feels “more sorrow and regret and apology” for this “than you can ever believe”. Blair accepted the criticisms in the Chilcot report, even when he does not fully agree with them. The intelligence assessments made at the time of going to war turned out to be wrong. The aftermath turned out to be more hostile, protracted and bloody than ever we imagined.
Alastair Campbell No10’s communications director at the time of the Iraq war told BBC News Tony Blair “was not giving George Bush a blank cheque”. He says there were “no easy decisions on the table”.
Jack Straw, then foreign secretaryreleased a statement saying that “with the benefit of hindsight, different decisions would have been made in Iraq”. He added: “The consequences which flow from the decision to take military action against Iraq will live with me for the rest of my life.”
During the inquiry Jack Straw also highlighted that in the run up to Iraq war, in the summer of 2002, the Blair government was more focused in dealing with prospect of a India-Pakistan war which was “a far more real and present danger to us than the conflict in Iraq.” Following the 2001 Indian parliament attack in New Delhi, the Blair government was “chiefly preoccupied” with trying to the persuade India and Pakistan to “back from the edge of war”.
One person who did not live to see the war, its aftermath and the verdict is Dr David Kelly. In 2003 Dr Kelly was a scientist and a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq with a specialisation in biological warfare. He reviewed a dossier by the Joint Intelligence Committee in 2002 while working for the Defence Intelligence Staff about the weapons of mass destruction possessed by Iraq. He testified in front of parliamentary foreign affairs select committee following the revelation of this dossier by a BBC journalist. He was found dead two days later after supposedly committing suicide. This dossier and its infamous ’45 minute’ claim was used by Tony Blair as the case for war with Iraq.
