The Chinese government has taken offence at New Delhi hosting the forthcoming Quad multilateral. Should it? Should Quad be anti-China? The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, is frequently described as an “Asian NATO.” This comparison is misleading. The Quad is not a formal military alliance but a flexible strategic partnership shaped by concerns over China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific. India’s role within the Quad is central yet distinctive: it is both a crucial balancing power against China and the member most resistant to becoming part of a rigid alliance system.
The Quad comprises India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Although cooperation began informally after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the grouping gained strategic significance after China’s increasing assertiveness under Xi Jinping. Beijing’s militarisation of the South China Sea, pressure on Taiwan, and clashes with India along the Himalayan border all contributed to renewed cooperation among the four states.
However, the Quad differs fundamentally from NATO. NATO contains binding treaty commitments, including collective defence obligations under Article 5. The Quad has no such commitments. There is no integrated military structure, no defence treaty, and no guarantee that members would fight on each other’s behalf. Instead, the Quad focuses on areas such as maritime security, supply chains, cybersecurity, infrastructure, and emerging technologies. Its deliberately loose structure reflects the differing interests of its members.
India’s approach best illustrates this ambiguity. Since independence under Jawaharlal Nehru, India has traditionally prioritised strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, this took the form of non-alignment. Today, India prefers what policymakers call “multi-alignment”: maintaining relationships with multiple major powers simultaneously. India cooperates closely with the United States through the Quad while also retaining ties with Russia and engaging economically with China where beneficial.
Consequently, India does not see the Quad simply as an anti-China bloc. For Washington, the Quad forms part of a broader effort to contain Chinese regional dominance. India’s objectives are narrower and more regional. Its primary concern is balancing Chinese power along the disputed Sino-Indian border and within the Indian Ocean. This explains why India remains cautious about turning the Quad into an overt military alliance.
Nevertheless, China’s actions have significantly altered Indian strategic thinking. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes, in which Indian and Chinese troops were killed in hand-to-hand combat, marked a turning point. Many in India concluded that China posed a long-term strategic threat. Since then, India has expanded naval cooperation with Quad partners, strengthened defence ties with the US and Japan, and become more active in Indo-Pacific security discussions.
India’s geographical position also makes it indispensable to the Quad. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India occupies a critical location near major global shipping routes. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, close to the Strait of Malacca, are strategically important because much of China’s imported energy passes through these waters. India therefore provides the Quad with significant maritime leverage.
Ultimately, the Quad is best understood not as a formal anti-China alliance but as a balancing coalition. Its members share concerns about China’s rise but differ in how far they are willing to confront Beijing directly. India’s role is pivotal because it combines cooperation with independence. Rather than seeking containment or confrontation, India aims to preserve a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific while maintaining its own strategic autonomy. In this sense, India is both the Quad’s greatest strength and its clearest limitation. Should the Chinese be so concerned? India is the best thing in Quad for the Chinese.
