The post-Cold War unipolar moment, dominated by American economic, military and institutional power, is widely regarded as over. The rise of China, the strategic autonomy of India, the reassertion of Russia, and the growing influence of regional powers have ushered in what is commonly described as a multipolar world.
Multipolarity in Theory: Stability or Disorder?
For Kenneth Waltz, bipolar systems were the most stable, as clear power balances reduced miscalculation. Multipolar systems, by contrast, risk instability due to shifting alliances and uncertain deterrence.
Liberal institutionalists argue that multipolarity can be stabilising if power is embedded in rules, norms and institutions. The problem today is that multipolarity is emerging faster than institutional reform, creating a gap between power distribution and governance capacity. The UN for instance is archaic.
The contemporary world therefore faces a transitional danger: not multipolarity itself, but unmanaged multipolarity.
Multipolarity as Opportunity: Diffusion, Autonomy and Legitimacy
Multipolarity also offers significant opportunities:
- Constraint on hegemony: No single power can unilaterally impose order, reducing the risk of imperial overreach.
- Strategic choice: States gain flexibility to pursue interests without binary alignment.
- Legitimacy: A world less dominated by the West may command broader acceptance, particularly in the Global South.
India’s Strategy: From Non-Alignment to Rule-Shaping Autonomy
India is uniquely positioned in a multipolar world. It is large enough to matter, but not yet dominant enough to threaten others. Its long tradition of non-alignment provides strategic credibility.
India should pursue three recalibrations:
First, India must deepen partnerships without surrendering autonomy. Engagement with the US, UK, Japan and Australia should focus on technology, defence innovation and supply chains, while avoiding formal alliances that constrain independent decision-making.
Second, India should shift from norm-taker to norm-shaper. Leadership in digital governance, climate adaptation, and development finance would allow India to influence the rules of the emerging order rather than merely navigate them.
Third, India should leverage multipolarity to reform institutions. A permanent UN Security Council seat and greater influence in global financial institutions are not symbolic ambitions, but stabilising necessities in a multipolar system.
India’s success will depend on converting strategic autonomy into institutional leadership rather than transactional hedging.
The UK’s Strategy: From Global Ambition to Strategic Specialisation
The UK faces a different challenge. It is no longer a great power, but it remains a consequential one.
Three adjustments are required:
First, the UK must align with the US on security while avoiding dependency. This means contributing high-value capabilities (intelligence, cyber, maritime assets) rather than symbolic deployments.
Second, the UK should treat India as a strategic equal, not merely a trade partner. A serious UK–India relationship must extend beyond commerce to co-operation in defence technology, AI governance, and education mobility.
Third, the UK should position itself as a connector state: a financial, legal and regulatory hub linking Indo-Pacific capital with European and Atlantic markets. This role suits Britain’s comparative advantages far better than military overstretch.
In a multipolar world, Britain’s influence will come not from scale, but from credibility and competence.
India should use multipolarity to entrench autonomy while shaping new global rules. The UK should recalibrate toward specialisation, partnership and connectivity rather than pretensions of dominance. If such strategies prevail, multipolarity may yet deliver a more balanced and legitimate global order. If not, fragmentation will become the defining feature of international politics in the decades ahead.
In short, multipolarity is not the problem. Mismanagement of it is.
