So the deal went live on 15th July. I appeared on BBC News to explain its meaning. Let me do that here again.
There is something wonderfully British about the reaction to the UK–India Free Trade Agreement. After years of negotiation with the world's fastest-growing major economy, much of the public debate has revolved around whisky, visas and whether Indian professionals might pay less National Insurance for a few years.
It is rather like discussing the upholstery while buying the house. Trade agreements are never really about tariffs. They are about choosing your friends. India's GDP growth creates the equivalent of a new Switzerland every two and a half years.
Britain has decided that, in an increasingly uncertain world, India is one of the countries with which it wishes to deepen its relationship. That matters far more than whether a bottle of Scotch becomes a little cheaper in Mumbai.
The numbers themselves are respectable rather than revolutionary. Government estimates suggest the agreement will add only around 0.13% to UK GDP over the long term. Nobody should pretend this transforms Britain's economic fortunes overnight. If your expectation was an economic equivalent of discovering North Sea oil all over again, disappointment is inevitable.
But economics is only half the story. The twenty-first century will not be shaped simply by trade. It will be shaped by artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cyber security, defence technology, resilient supply chains and the competition between democratic and authoritarian systems.
Viewed through that lens, the agreement takes on a rather different significance. India is becoming one of the world's indispensable technology powers. It possesses extraordinary engineering talent, enormous scale, an increasingly sophisticated digital economy and an ambition that few countries can match.
Britain, meanwhile, continues to punch above its weight in research, finance, artificial intelligence, higher education and innovation. We remain exceptionally good at inventing things, financing things and regulating things.
Those strengths are complementary. The real prize is therefore not cheaper exports. It is creating the framework within which British universities, technology companies, defence manufacturers and financial institutions become ever more deeply connected with one of the most important economies of this century.
Critics have inevitably reached for immigration. The facts are less dramatic than the headlines. The agreement does not create a new work visa. It does not create free movement. It does not open Britain's borders. It streamlines temporary business mobility in limited areas while maintaining existing immigration rules. That may not fit comfortably into social media outrage, but it does fit the facts. Or, as I said on the BBC, don't worry, there won't be streams of people who look like me swamping the NHS, other than the doctors, of course.
Perhaps the most important lesson is one Britain repeatedly forgets. Economic relationships are built over decades, not news cycles. China understood this. The United States understands it. Increasingly, Europe understands it.
Britain must understand it too. Whether on AI safety, quantum computing, cyber resilience, clean energy or Indo-Pacific security, the countries that matter tomorrow are those with whom we build trusted partnerships today.
This agreement should therefore be judged not by the tariff schedule but by what follows. Do British firms invest more? Do Indian technology companies choose Britain as their European headquarters? Do universities collaborate more closely?
Do defence industries innovate together? Do entrepreneurs see London and Bengaluru as partners rather than competitors? Those are the questions history will ask. The free trade agreement is not the destination.
It is the boarding pass. The real journey is towards a broader strategic partnership between two democracies that, despite all their differences, have every reason to prosper together.
