Working in the US Congress, with my Congressman we lobbied the US State Department to declare Pakistan a Terrorist State because of its nuclear proliferation. They wouldn’t listen. That was 1994. I was 23. In the end we provided the evidence to the Indian Embassy in Washington.
Now America continuing its love affair with Pakistan, gets more of what it deserves – the fear of an Iranian-Pakistan nuclear bomb. America either doesn’t listen or is complicit.
Pakistan, primarily through the covert proliferation network run by Abdul Qadir Khan provided critical assistance to Iran's nuclear program during the late 1980s and 1990s. This included supplying P-1 and P-2 centrifuge designs, components, and blueprints for uranium enrichment, as well as potential nuclear weapon designs.
- Centrifuge Technology Transfer: Khan's network provided Iran with centrifuge designs identical to those used in Pakistan’s own program, facilitating Iran's ability to enrich uranium at sites like Natanz.
- Technical Training: Iranian scientists were reportedly trained in Pakistan regarding nuclear enrichment technologies around 1988.
- Nuclear Weapons Designs: Evidence suggests that Pakistan-based networks may have provided blueprints for a nuclear warhead design, which Iran likely reworked in its 1999–2003 nuclear initiatives.
- Personal Capacity vs. State Action: While the Pakistani government claimed Khan acted in his "personal capacity," evidence suggests involvement, with shipments facilitated through networks and payments routed through Dubai.
- Discovery and Impact: The network was exposed in 2003, leading to Khan's confession in 2004, though the assistance significantly advanced Iran's nuclear technical capabilities.
When India attacked terrorists in Pakistan in Operation Sindoor it confirmed the controlled instability route than outright war to international conflict.
The United States and Israel jointly initiated strikes despite diplomatic engagements and the prospect of agreement in Geneva, demonstrating a willingness to use force even while negotiations continued. There was no imminent threat to the US, although the American Foreign Secretary made the convoluted argument that once Israel attacked, then America would have been attacked…imminently…so the attack was legal. Those of us on the right of the political spectrum are happy with the moral position over the legal one when it comes to attacking the Islamic Republic.
“Controlled instability” refers to a situation in which great powers engage in calibrated use of force, limited engagements, and selective escalation, while avoiding total war. It is distinct from stable deterrence: in deterrence, violence is prevented; in controlled instability, violence is tolerated within managed bounds. India responded by attacking terrorist camps in Pakistan due to the imminent threat and self defence legal doctrine in Operation Sindoor. Pakistan, in attacking Afghanistan, claimed to be doing the same, but unlike India was neither proportionate nor directed at the specific claimed threat, which legality of action requires. Trump’s favourite General was just acting in hypocrisy.
This model of controlled instability is emerging because:
- States face domestic constraints that limit prolonged, large-scale war, making limited engagements more attractive.
- Multipolarity and competing interests reduce shared commitment to cooperative order.
- Proxy networks and regional actors mean that local actors can escalate without directly triggering great-power commitments.
In the U.S.–Iran case, this logic is evident. Neither side appears willing or able to escalate into all-out conflict, yet both engage in provocative actions - strikes, assassinations, and retaliations - while signalling that a broader confrontation is undesirable. President Trump’s statements that the campaign could last weeks but is “prepared to go far longer” reflect this ambiguity: force without clear end conditions.
Evidence of Managed Escalation in 2026
Recent developments illustrate controlled instability rather than outright breakdown:
- The targeted attacks were followed by measured retaliation, rather than uncontrollable escalation of theatre-wide conflict.
- Diplomatic channels in Geneva and Muscat have remained open even as violence unfolds, suggesting parallel tracks of conflict and negotiation.
- International actors such as China, Europe and the United Nations have called for restraint, indicating that global opinion still acts as a brake.
These dynamics are not characteristic of total war but of a calibrated interplay between coercion, signalling and caution.
Though it avoids outright war, controlled instability is not benign:
- It lowers the threshold for violence, making limited strikes and assassinations part of routine diplomacy.
- It normalises retaliation cycles, encouraging tit-for-tat escalations.
- It undermines institutional conflict resolution, as force replaces negotiation.
- It spreads instability to third parties, as seen in attacks in Kuwait, Bahrain and threats to key shipping lanes.
In this sense, controlled instability may be more dangerous than stable deterrence, because it clouds incentives and normalises confrontation.
India for one has made clear through its actions to Pakistan – expect controlled instability if you continue with your terrorist bases.