New Delhi is treading carefully after President Donald Trump appeared to soften his tone toward India, following weeks of strained relations marked by Washington’s imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian goods.
While Trump insists there was “nothing to worry about” in US-India ties, describing the relationship as “special” and praising Narendra Modi as a “great prime minister” and “friend.” Modi responded hours later on X, thanking Trump and saying he “deeply” appreciated the sentiment, though notably, he stopped short of calling Trump a friend, signalling a more cautious approach than in the past.
Furthermore, in a strategic move, Prime Minister Modi will skip the BRICS summit in Brazil, with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar representing India instead. (More on page 25)
The two leaders share a history of warm personal ties. Modi was among the first world leaders to meet Trump after his return to the White House earlier this year. Their Washington meeting in February was marked by bear hugs and promises to seal a trade deal before year’s end.
Yet Trump has long criticised India’s trade barriers, repeatedly branding the country a “tariff king.” But the reality is more complex: while India does impose high duties in sectors like agriculture and automobiles, its overall tariff levels are not exceptional compared to many other economies. The label of “tariff king,” analysts argue, is more myth than fact.
Mohan Kumar, Former Indian Ambassador and Director General of Jadeja Motwani Institute for American Studies, writing for Newsweek explains that the “tariff king” label largely stems from the figure of India’s simple average tariff, calculated at around 16%.
Yet this figure is misleading, because it treats every tariff line equally, regardless of its economic weight. A more meaningful measure is the trade-weighted average tariff, which considers actual volumes of imports and their significance to the economy. By this calculation, India’s effective tariff rate is closer to 4.6%, placing it far closer to global norms than the sensational headlines suggest.
India did once have among the world’s highest tariffs, particularly before the 1991 economic liberalisation. Since then, successive governments have steadily cut duties, opening up one of the fastest-growing consumer markets in the world. Today, entire sectors, like information technology hardware, semiconductors, and energy, face minimal or zero tariffs, contradicting the idea of a blanket protectionist regime.
Where India does impose higher duties, these are often concentrated in agriculture and automobiles. Critics point to steep tariffs on cars or farm products as evidence of protectionism.
But the rationale is not unique: protecting millions of small farmers from subsidised global competition, and fostering domestic auto manufacturing, are legitimate policy choices. Countries from the EU to Japan and South Korea do the same, often at much higher rates. Rather than being an outlier, India’s tariff regime looks remarkably mainstream when compared to both developed and developing peers. Vietnam, China, and Indonesia, for example, impose higher tariffs than India on a range of electronics. In many cases, India’s duties are even lower than those in economies widely seen as open and export-oriented.
The “tariff king” narrative obscures the more complex reality of India’s global trade strategy. While it does use tariffs selectively, particularly to safeguard jobs in sensitive sectors, its overall tariff regime is no more restrictive than many of its peers, and in some cases far less so. India is not building walls; it is balancing openness with economic security.
The real question is not whether India is a “tariff king,” but whether the world is ready to look beyond rhetoric and engage with India as the dynamic, pragmatic trading power it has become.
